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contract theory 
 
This article offers a brief overview of contract. It focuses on the theory of 
complete contracts and the three associated paradigms of adverse selection, 
moral hazard and non-verifiability. By showing difficulties in allocating 
resources between asymmetrically informed partners, contract theory has 
deeply changed our view of the functioning of organizations and markets.   
 
As with so many major concepts in economics, contract theory was introduced by 
Adam Smith who, in his monumental Wealth of Nations (1776, book III, ch. 2), 
considered the relationship between peasants and farmers through this lens. For 
instance, he pointed out the perverse incentives provided by sharecropping contracts, 
widespread in 18th-century Europe. However, it is fair to say that the issues of 
incentives and contract theory were largely ignored by economists until the end of the 
20th century. By then, the focus of economic theory was on the working of markets 
and price formation. Firms were viewed only as production technologies, and the 
issue of the separation between ownership and control was most often put aside. This 
black-box approach was, of course, quite unsatisfactory. At the turn of the 1970s, with 
the methodological revolution of game theory, more emphasis was placed on strategic 
interactions between a small number of players in a world where informational 
problems matter. From this new perspective, the allocation of resources is no longer 
ruled by the price system but by contracts between asymmetrically informed partners. 
Contract theory has deeply changed our view of the functioning of organizations and 
markets.  
This article aims to provide a brief overview of contract theory, stressing a few 
major insights and illustrating them with useful applications. Due to space constraints, 
it does not do justice to several aspects of contract theory, and will mostly reflect my 
own tastes in the field. In particular, I focus on the so-called theory of complete 
contracts, leaving aside the burgeoning theory of incomplete contracts which is 
covered elsewhere in this dictionary.  Successive sections deal respectively, with 
adverse selection, moral hazard and non-verifiability: the three different paradigms 
which have been used in the field of complete contract theory. Since the distinction 
between complete and incomplete contracts is easier to draw once these notions have 
already been explained, I will postpone such discussion to the end of the article. 
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Adverse selection 
Consider the following buyer–seller relationship as the archetypical example of 
contractual relationship between a principal (the buyer) and his agent (the seller) who 
produces some good or service on his behalf. The mere delegation of this task to the 
agent gives the agent access to private information about the technology. This adverse 
selection environment is captured by assuming that a technological parameter θ  is 
known only by the agent. It is drawn from a distribution in an exogenous type space Θ 
which is common knowledge. Neither the principal nor a court of law observes this 
parameter. Contracts cannot specify outputs and prices as a function of the realized 
state of nature.  
The buyer enjoys a net benefit ( )S q tθ , −  when buying q units of output at a price 
t. The seller enjoys a profit ( )t C qθ− ,  from producing that good. We will assume that 
these functions are concave in q. Notice that the state of nature θ  might affect both 
the agent’s and the principal’s utility functions. This can, for instance, be the case if 
this parameter also determines the quality of the good to be traded.  
Under complete information, efficiency requires that the buyer and the seller trade 
the first-best quantity ( )q θ∗  such that the buyer’s marginal benefit from consumption 
equals the seller’s marginal cost of production:  
 ( ( )) ( ( ))S Cq q
q q
θ θ θ θ∗ ∗∂ ∂, = , .∂ ∂  (1) 
Many mechanisms or institutions lead to this outcome. Both the price mechanism 
and a take-it-or-leave-it offer by one party to the other would achieve the same 
allocation, although with different distributions of the surplus between the traders. If 
the principal retains all bargaining power (for instance, because there is a competitive 
fringe of potential sellers), he could offer a forcing contract stipulating an output 
( )q θ∗  and a transfer ( )t θ∗  which just covers the seller’s cost. This forcing contract 
maximizes the buyer’s net gains from trade and leaves the seller just indifferent 
between participating or not.  
In what follows, we mostly focus on the case where the uninformed principal has 
full bargaining power in contracting. In this framework, the contract between the 
buyer and the seller does not only have the allocative and distributive roles it has 
under complete information. It also has the role of communicating information from 
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the informed party to the uninformed party. This communication role suggests that the 
informed party should be given a choice among different options and that this choice 
should reveal information about the adverse selection parameter.  
A first step in the analysis consists of describing the set of allocations which are 
feasible under asymmetric information. The basic tool for doing so is the revelation 
principle (see Gibbard, 1973; Green and Laffont, 1977; Dasgupta, Hammond and 
Maskin, 1979; and Myerson, 1979, among others), which states that there is no loss of 
generality in restricting the analysis to revelation mechanisms that are direct, that is, 
of the form ˆˆ ˆ{ ( ) ( )}t q θθ θ ∈Θ,  with θˆ  a message (‘report’) sent by the informed seller to 
the uninformed buyer, and truthful, that is, such that the agent finds it optimal to 
report his true type.  
Therefore, incentive feasible contracts satisfy the following incentive constraints  
 2ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( )t C q t C qθ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ− , ≥ − , ∀ , ∈Θ .  (2) 
To be acceptable, a contract must also satisfy the seller’s participation constraints  
 ( ) ( ( )) 0t C qθ θ θ θ− , ≥ ∀ ∈Θ  (3) 
which ensure that, irrespective of his type, the agent by contracting gets at least his 
reservation payoff (exogenously normalized to zero).  
Once the set of incentive feasible allocations is described, the analysis may 
proceed further. Keeping in mind that the uninformed buyer designs his offer under 
asymmetric information, we might characterize an optimal contract. Such a contract 
maximizes the uninformed buyer’s expected net surplus subject to the feasibility 
constraints (2) and (3).  
 Much of the theoretical literature developed over the 1980s and early 1990s 
has investigated the structure of the set of incentive feasible allocations and its 
consequences for optimal contracting. A key property is the so-called Spence–
Mirrlees condition (see Spence, 1973; 1974; and Mirrlees, 1971) for early 
contributions which put forward that condition).  This condition is satisfied when the 
slope of the agent’s indifference curves can be ranked with respect to his type. In our 
example, this condition holds when 2 0Cqθ∂∂ ∂ > , that is, when higher types also have 
higher marginal costs and should thus produce less. Therefore, the monotonicity 
condition  
 ( ) ( ) forq qθ θ θ θ′ ′≥ <  (4) 
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is a direct consequence of the incentive constraints. The Spence–Mirrlees condition 
can be viewed as a regularity assumption making the incentive problem well-behaved. 
It ensures that only incentive constraints between ‘nearby’ types matter in the 
optimization. Intuitively, this means that the seller with a given marginal cost may be 
tempted to overstate slightly its costs, receiving the higher transfer targeted to less 
efficient types but producing at a lower marginal cost. By so doing, this more efficient 
type receives an information rent. Once these local constraints are taken into account 
and when the Spence–Mirrlees condition holds, the incentives to mimic more distant 
types are no longer relevant. With this reduction of the set of relevant incentive 
constraints, the principal’s optimization problem is significantly simplified.  
The result of this optimization is straightforward. Inducing information revelation 
by the most efficient types requires giving up an information rent to those types. The 
basic intuition of most adverse-selection models is that reducing this rent requires  
production to be distorted. For instance, when efficient types want to mimic less 
efficient ones, the latter’s allocation should be made less attractive. This is obtained 
by distorting their production downward and modifying transfers accordingly.  
To see more formally the nature of the output distortion, consider the case where 
types are distributed over a compact set [ ]θ θ,  according to the cumulative 
distribution function ( )F ⋅  (with a positive density ( )f ⋅ ). The second-best optimal 
output ( )SBq θ  under adverse selection is the solution to:  
 
2( )( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))
( )
SB SB SBS C F Cq q q
q q f q
θθ θ θ θ θ θθ θ
∂ ∂ ∂, = , + , .∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  (5) 
Condition (5) states that, for any type θ, the buyer’s marginal benefit must equal the 
seller’s marginal virtual cost (see Laffont and Martimort, 2002, chs 2 and 3, for 
details).  The virtual cost of a given type takes into account not only its cost of 
production but also the cost of deterring other types (here more efficient types) from 
mimicking that type. The allocation is no longer efficient, as under complete 
information, but interim efficient in the sense of Holmström and Myerson (1983).  
Condition (5) is crucial, and is found in various forms in any adverse-selection 
model. It states that, under asymmetric information, there is a fundamental trade-off 
between implementing allocations close to efficiency and giving information rents to 
the most efficient types to induce information revelation. This trade-off calls for 
distortions away from efficiency. 
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 Provided that the output schedule defined by (5) satisfies the monotonicity 
condition (4), this is the exact solution of our problem. To guarantee monotonicity, on 
top of assumptions on the concavity of ( )S ⋅  and  ( )Sθ∂∂ ⋅ ,  convexity of ( )C ⋅  and ( )Cθ∂∂ ⋅ , 
2 ( ) 0Cqθ∂∂ ∂ ⋅ > , 32 ( ) 0Cqθ∂∂ ∂ ⋅ >  and 
2 ( ) 0Sqθ∂∂ ∂ ⋅ < , one needs also to impose a property on the 
type distribution, the so-called monotonicity of the hazard rate ( )( )
F
f
θ
θ  (see Bagnoli and 
Bergstrom, 2005).  Otherwise, the optimal contract may entail some area of pooling 
such that all types belonging to a set with positive measure produce the same amount 
and are paid the same price. The optimal solution may then be obtained using ‘ironing 
techniques’ (see for instance Guesnerie and Laffont, 1984). 
 
Direct extensions  
Adverse-selection methodology has been successfully extended in various directions 
allowing for multidimensional types (Armstrong and Rochet, 1999), and/or multiple 
outputs (Laffont and Tirole, 1993, ch. 3), and type-dependent reservation utilities 
(Lewis and Sappington, 1989; Jullien, 2000). There, the analysis is substantially more 
complex as types can no longer be ranked as easily as in the model sketched above. 
The Spence–Mirrlees condition might fail to hold and global incentive constraints 
may bind, leading to pooling allocations being optimal. Another interesting extension 
is the case of hidden knowledge, in which contracting takes place before the agent 
becomes informed. The logic of such models is very close to that we will discuss 
below in the section on moral hazard. In a nutshell, the trade-off between allocative 
efficiency and rent extraction is now replaced by the trade-off between insuring the 
agent against shocks on costs and inducing him to reveal his cost once it is known. 
Output distortions still arise (see Laffont and Martimort, 2002, ch. 2, for details). 
Others have endogenized the asymmetric information structure and examined the 
incentives to learn about the unknown parameter (see, for instance, Crémer, Khalil 
and Rochet, 1998). Finally, there exists a literature that considers the case where the 
principal is the informed party (Maskin and Tirole, 1990; 1992). New difficulties arise 
from the fact that the mere offer of the contract may signal information.  
 
Multiagent organizations 
The most important extensions of the adverse selection paradigm certainly concern 
multi-agent organizations. Such complex organizations emerge because of the need to 
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share common resources, produce public goods, internalize production externalities or 
enjoy information economies of scale. Although any such reason calls for a specific 
analysis, a few common themes of the literature can be highlighted by remaining at a 
rather general level.  
 Regarding the implementation concept, different notions of incentive 
compatibility may be used depending on the context. First, agents may know each 
other’s types and play a Nash equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism offered 
by the principal (see Maskin, 1999, and the discussion of the non-verifiability 
paradigm below).  Second, agents may only know their own type, form beliefs on 
each others’ types and play a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (see D’Aspremont and 
Gérard-Varet, 1979).  Third, one may also insist on dominant strategy implementation 
because it does not depend on the specification of beliefs (see Gibbard, 1973; Groves, 
1973; Green and Laffont, 1977).  To each implementation concept corresponds a 
notion of incentive feasibility. Once the set of incentive feasible contracts is defined, 
one can proceed to optimization. It is a trivial observation that, the more restrictive the 
implementation concept, the lower is the principal’s payoff at the optimum.  
 In some cases, such as the provision of public goods within a society of 
privately informed agents or in bargaining models between a buyer and a seller with 
equal bargaining power, the goal is no longer to design a multilateral contract which 
would extract the rents of all agents but, instead, to maximize some ex ante efficiency 
criterion under incentive constraints. Groves (1973) showed that dominant strategy 
mechanisms suffice to implement the first-best decision in a public good context. One 
caveat is that the budget generally fails to be balanced. D’Aspremont and Gérard-
Varet (1979) proposed a Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism which 
implements the first-best and still satisfies budget balance. As argued by Laffont and 
Maskin (1979), such a mechanism may conflict with the agents’ participation 
constraint. In a bargaining environment, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) showed in 
a similar vein that there exists no Bayesian bargaining mechanism that is efficient, 
budget-balance and individually rational.  
 The optimal multilateral contract can be very sensitive to the information 
structure. In environments where risk-neutral agents have correlated types but know 
only their own type, the principal can condition one agent’s compensation on 
another’s report. By doing so, the principal can fully extract the rent from both agents 
in a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. One may view this result as a strong rationale for 
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relative performance evaluation, yardstick competition, benchmarking and 
internalization of similar activities within the same organization. This puzzling insight 
of Crémer and McLean (1988) no longer holds when one introduces risk-aversion, ex 
post participation constraints or limited liability constraints. These assumptions 
reintroduce information rents in the multi-agent organization, and the standard trade-
off between efficiency and rent extraction reappears. 
 When the agents’ types are independently distributed, yardstick competition is 
ineffective and the agents derive information rents. However, the externality that one 
agent’s task may exert on another can shape the distribution of these rents. In 
competitive environments, such as procurement auctions among sellers, it is no longer 
the distribution of the agents’ marginal costs but the distribution of their virtual 
marginal costs (see Myerson, 1981) which determines who should produce and how 
much. Because virtual costs may be ranked differently from true costs, inefficiencies 
arise under asymmetric information.  Moreover, competition may help reduce rents by 
putting each agent under the threat of being excluded from production if he overstates 
his cost too much. There is then a positive externality among competing agents.  
Instead, more cooperative environments, such as public good problems or 
procurement of complementary inputs by several suppliers, involve negative 
externalities between agents. Given that each agent has a limited impact on the 
organization’s overall production, the incentives to overstate costs and thereby receive 
greater transfers are exacerbated. ‘Free riding’ arises in such organizations (see 
Mailath and Postlewaite, 1990).  
 When competition between agents or between agents and the supervisors 
supposed to monitor them would benefit the principal, one must consider the 
possibility of collusion aimed at securing more rent. Reducing the scope for collusion 
requires using mechanisms that are less sensitive to information and reducing 
supervisory discretion. Incentive contracts look more like inflexible bureaucratic rules 
(see Tirole, 1986; Laffont and Martimort, 2000). The optimal response to collusion 
may also entail more delegation to lower levels of the hierarchy, as in Laffont and 
Martimort (1998) and Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (2003).  
 
Dynamics  
Different extensions of the static framework correspond to different abilities of the 
contractual partners to commit themselves inter-temporally and/or different ways for 
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the cost parameters to vary over time. Under full commitment, the lessons of the static 
rent–efficiency trade-off can be easily extended, although the precise features of the 
optimal contract depend on how types evolve over time (see, for instance, Baron and 
Besanko, 1984, for the case of persistent types). The case of limited commitment is 
more interesting. Long-term contracts may either be renegotiated (Dewatripont, 1989; 
Hart and Tirole, 1988; Laffont and Tirole, 1990) or even are not feasible, in which 
cases the parties resort to spot contracts (Laffont and Tirole, 1988). The rent–
efficiency trade-off must be adapted to take into account how information is revealed 
progressively over time. However, the basic idea still holds. As past performances 
reveal information about the agent’s type, the optimal contract trades off ex post 
efficiency gains in contracting against the agent’s desire to hide information in the 
earlier periods of the relationship so as to secure more rent in the later periods.  
 
Applications 
Since the mid-1980s, models of optimal contracting under adverse selection have 
spanned the economic literature. Let us quote only a few major applications. Mirrlees 
(1971) analysed optimal taxation schemes when the agent’s productivity is privately 
observed. He introduced the Spence–Mirrlees condition and derived the 
implementability conditions. He also used optimal control techniques (Pontryagyn 
Principle) to compute the optimal taxation scheme. (The taxation problem differs 
from our buyer–seller example because participation in the mechanism is mandatory 
and the state’s budget constraint must be added to the characterization of feasible 
allocations.) 
Mussa and Rosen (1978) studied the problem of a monopolist selling one unit of a 
good to a continuum of consumers vertically differentiated with respect to their 
willingness to pay for the quality of this good. This was the first model using adverse 
selection techniques in a framework without income effect. Maskin and Riley (1984) 
were interested in characterizing the optimal nonlinear price used by a monopolist in a 
second-degree price discrimination context.  
Baron and Myerson (1982) applied the methodology to the regulation of natural 
monopolies privately informed about their marginal costs of production. Laffont and 
Tirole (1986) extended this analysis to allow for cost observability but also introduced 
moral hazard elements (the possibility for the regulated firm to reduce its costs by 
undertaking some non-observable effort). They derived cost-reimbursement rules and 
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pricing policies. They showed that menus of linear contracts might implement the 
optimal contract.  
Green and Kahn (1983) and Hart (1983) studied labour market contracts and 
discussed distortions towards overemployment or underemployment that may arise 
depending on the contractual environment considered.  
Finally, Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) analysed optimal financial 
contracts in a framework where the borrower’s income is observable only ex post and 
at a cost. Optimal contracts may look like debt in such environments.  
 
Moral hazard 
To return to our buyer–seller example, we now assume that there is only one unit of a 
good to be traded whose quality q is random and which yields a surplus ( )S q  to the 
buyer. The distribution of quality is affected by an effort e undertaken by the agent at 
a cost ( )eψ  (where 0ψ ′ >  and 0ψ ′′ > ). The cumulative distribution is ( )F q e|  (with 
density ( )f q e| ) on a support [ ]Q q q= ,  independent of the agent’s effort. To 
simplify, the agent’s preferences are separable in money and effort: ( ) ( )U u t eψ= −  
where ( )u ⋅  is increasing and concave ( 0 0)u u′ > , ″ ≤ . The agent’s outside option is not 
to produce, which gives him a payoff normalized to zero.  
The agent’s effort is observable neither by the principal nor by a court of law. This 
is a moral hazard setting. Contracts stipulate the agent’s payment as a function of the 
realized quality assumed to be observable and verifiable (contractible) by a court of 
law. Therefore, contracts are of the form { ( )}q Qt q ∈%% .  
If the effort were observable, its value could also be specified by contract. 
Therefore, the seller can at the same time be forced to exert the first-best level of 
effort and be fully insured against uncertainty on realized quality with a flat payment 
independent of his performance:  
 ( ) ( )u t eψ∗ ∗= .   
 
This is no longer the case when the agent’s effort is non-verifiable. The first step of 
the analysis is to describe the set of feasible incentive contracts implementing a given 
level of effort e.  
In a moral hazard setting, incentive constraints write as:  
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 ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )
q q
q q
u t q f q e dq e u t q f q e dq e e eψ ψ′ ′ ′| − ≥ | − ∀ , .∫ ∫  (6) 
The agent’s participation constraint is:  
 ( ( )) ( ) ( ) 0
q
q
u t q f q e dq eψ| − ≥ .∫  (7) 
Risk-neutrality  
A first case of interest is when the agent is risk-neutral ( ( ) )u t t≡ . The simple ‘sell-
out’ contract, ( ) ( )t q S q C= −  where C is a constant, implements the first-best level of 
effort e*. Provided that ( ) ( ) ( )
q
q
C S q f q e eψ∗ ∗= | −∫ , this scheme also extracts all the 
surplus from the agent who is just indifferent between producing or not.  
Intuitively, with such a ‘sell-out’ contract, the agent’s private incentives to exert 
effort are aligned with the social incentives. This efficient outcome is obtained by, 
first, having the agent pay a bond worth C for the right to serve the principal, and 
second, having the principal pay an amount S(q) contingent on the quality realized.  
 Such a ‘sell-out’ contract requires that the agent bear the full consequences of 
a bad performance. It might not be feasible when the agent has limited liability and 
cannot be punished for bad performances. (For details, see Laffont and Martimort, 
2002, ch. 4).  The conjunction of moral hazard and limited liability allows the agent to 
derive a limited liability rent. Intuitively, only rewards, not punishments, can be used 
to provide incentives, and this restriction on instruments is costly for the principal. 
This rent creates a trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction, as in the adverse 
selection framework. Effort is distorted below the first-best level.  
 
Risk-aversion  
Let us turn to the more complex case of risk-aversion. A first concern of the literature 
has been to ‘simplify’ the set of incentive constraints (2) by replacing it with a first-
order condition:  
 ( ( )) ( ) ( )
q
eq
u t q f q e dq eψ| = ′ .∫  (8) 
Denoting by λ (resp. μ) the positive multiplier of the incentive (resp. participation) 
constraint (8) (resp. (7)), the optimal second-best schedule ( )SBt q  satisfies  
 ( )1
( ( )) ( )
e
SB
f q e
u t q f q e
μ λ |= + .′ |  (9) 
This condition yields two important insights. First, the contract must simultaneously 
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provide the risk-averse agent with insurance, which requires a fixed payment, and 
with incentives to exert effort, which requires that payments be linked to performance. 
There is now a trade-off between insurance and incentives.  
Second, the monotonicity of the agent’s compensation with respect to the quality 
level (a priori a quite intuitive property) is obtained only when the monotone 
likelihood ratio property holds, namely, when ( )( )( ) 0ef q eq f q e|∂∂ | > . This property means that 
higher levels of performance are more informative about the agent’s effort.  
Finally, the optimal contract must use all signals which are informative about the 
agent’s effort but no uninformative signals. Using them would only let the agent bear 
more risk without any beneficial impact on incentives. This is the so-called 
informativeness principle of Holmström (1979).  
 
Extensions  
In a model with a finite number of quality and effort levels, Grossman and Hart 
(1983) offered a careful study of the set of incentive constraints and its consequences 
for the shape of optimal contracts. There is no general result on the ranking between 
the first-best and the second-best effort levels in such environments. The discrete 
version of the first-order approach requires that only nearby constraints matter in the 
agent’s problem. This concavity of the agent’s problem is ensured when ( )F q e| is 
itself convex in q. In models with a continuum of effort levels and outcomes, this 
first-order approach was suggested in Mirrlees (1999), more rigorously justified in 
Rogerson (1985) and Jewitt (1988) and applied in Holmström (1979) and Shavell 
(1979).  
The moral hazard methodology has been used to justify the optimality of linear 
incentive schemes in well-structured environments (Holmström and Milgrom, 1987); 
an often found feature of real world contracts. Equipped with this tool, Holmström 
and Milgrom (1991; 1994) investigated how multiple tasks and jobs should be 
arranged in an organization.  
To avoid the complexity of models with a continuum of effort levels, modellers 
have found it useful to focus on simplified environments with two levels of effort. 
This approach was instrumental in the work on corporate finance of Holmström and 
Tirole (1997).  
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Multi-agent organizations 
When applied to multi-agent organizations, the ‘informativeness principle’ suggests 
that an agent’s compensation should be linked to another’s performance if it is 
informative about his own effort (see Mookherjee, 1984). Relative performance 
evaluation and benchmarking can help eliminate common shocks affecting all agents’ 
performances. Of particular importance in this respect are tournaments which use only 
the ranking of the agents’ performances to determinate their compensations. 
Tournaments provide agents with insurance against common shocks, which has a 
positive incentive effect. More generally, the properties of tournaments and how they 
compare with (a priori suboptimal) linear schemes have been investigated in Nalebuff 
and Stiglitz (1983) and Green and Stokey (1983).  
In more cooperative environments where different agents contribute to a joint 
project, the fundamental difficulty is how to share the proceeds of production among 
agents of the team and still provide some incentives. Since each agent enjoys only a 
fraction of those proceeds but bears the full cost of his effort, he reduces his effort 
supply. This leads to a free-rider problem within teams, which is analysed in 
Holmström (1982).  
If we remain in cooperative environments but allow now for a principal acting as a 
budget breaker, this principal may find it worthwhile to reduce the agency cost of 
implementing a given effort profile by having agents behave cooperatively (Itoh, 
1993). Even when agents do not cooperate, mutual observability of effort levels can 
also help to eliminate agency cost, as in Ma (1988). This last argument relies on the 
logic of non-verifiability models, developed below.  
 
Dynamics  
The basic issue investigated by dynamic models of moral hazard is the extent to 
which repeated relationships alleviate the moral hazard problem. The intuition is that 
the principal should filter out the agent’s effort by looking at the whole history of his 
performances. This may eliminate any agency problem, at least when parties do not 
discount too much the future (see Laffont and Martimort, 2002, ch. 8, for an 
example).  More generally, the insurance–incentives trade-off may be relaxed when 
the risk-averse agent’s rewards and punishments can be smoothed over the whole 
relationship, as shown in Spear and Strivastava (1987). A direct consequence of inter-
temporal smoothing is that the optimal dynamic contract exhibits memory; good (resp. 
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bad) performance today will also affect positively (resp. negatively) future 
compensations. This insight has been used to formalize a theory of the wage dynamics 
inside the firm (Harris and Holmström, 1982).  
Fama (1980) argued that reputation in the labour market exerts enough discipline 
on managers to alleviate moral hazard even in the absence of explicit contracts. 
Holmström (1999) built a model of career concerns where the manager’s interest in 
influencing the labour market’s beliefs concerning his or her quality provides 
incentives to exert effort. Career concerns are nevertheless in general not enough to 
induce first-best effort levels, and some inefficiencies remain.  
 
Non-verifiability 
Let us return to the buyer–seller model above. Although we now assume that it is 
observable by both the principal and the agent, the state of nature θ  may still not be 
verifiable by a court of law, in which case it cannot be part of the contract. This 
shared knowledge stands in sharp contrast with the asymmetric information structures 
examined in previous sections.  
The first difficulty consists of building a mechanism based only on verifiable 
variables (namely, the quantities traded and corresponding payments) which 
implements the first-best quantity ( )q θ∗  and transfers ( )t θ∗ . This problem was 
addressed by Maskin (1999). He demonstrated that the first-best quantities and 
transfers can easily be implemented with a direct revelation mechanism 
2ˆ ˆ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ{ ( ) ( )}
a b
a b a bt q θ θθ θ θ θ , ∈Θ, , ,  where both the buyer and the seller report simultaneously 
the state of nature they commonly know. Truth-telling is obviously a Nash 
equilibrium of this mechanism provided that both traders are severely punished when 
making different reports, since such cases would be inconsistent with the underlying 
information structure.  
 A more subtle issue is how to design a mechanism such that this truthful Nash 
equilibrium is unique. Maskin (1999) proposed a condition for players’ preferences 
such that this is the case. Moore and Repullo (1988) significantly extended the 
domain of preferences by hardening the implementation concept, replacing Nash 
behaviour by subgame-perfection in a sequential moves mechanism (see Laffont and 
Martimort, 2002, ch. 6, for an example, and Moore, 1992, for an exhaustive survey of 
the literature). 
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The basic thrust of the non-verifiability paradigm is that a court of law can get 
around non-verifiability by building such revelation mechanisms, at least as long as 
the non-verifiable state is payoff-relevant. If one sticks to that interpretation, non-
verifiability does not present a significant limit on contracting.  
A second issue of the literature is the impact of non-verifiability on the incentives 
of traders to perform specific and non-verifiable investments. Given our previous 
claim that non-verifiability is generally not a constraint, the model resembles the 
standard moral hazard model. Providing incentives for investments meets the same 
difficulties as in the previous section.  
 
Extensions 
In practice, revelation mechanisms have been criticized as overly complex, as relying 
on threats which may either be non-credible or violate limited liability constraints. 
The so-called incomplete contracts literature has thus focused on cases where such 
revelation mechanisms are not feasible. In such environments, either no contract at all 
or only a very rough one can be written ex ante. For instance, parties can agree ex ante 
on a simple fixed-price/fixed quantity contract which serves as a threat point for the 
bargaining which takes place ex post when the state of nature is realized (see Edlin 
and Reichelstein, 1996, among others).  
 Alternatively, this threat point may be determined by the allocation of 
ownership rights where such a right gives the owner the opportunity to use assets as 
he prefers in case bargaining fails (see Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 
1988). The issue is then to derive from those exogenous constraints distortions of 
investments and optimal organizations which may mitigate those distortions.  
The incomplete contracts paradigm is similar to the complete contracts one 
(adverse selection, moral hazard and non-verifiability) in the sense that it also imposes 
limits on what a court may verify. It differs from it because it also imposes exogenous 
restrictions on the set of mechanisms available to the parties. The justification for 
these restrictions is found either in the bounded rationality of players or the 
difficulties in describing or foreseeing contingencies, all theoretical issues which 
remain high on the agenda of economic theorists and are still unsettled. The relevant 
literature on incomplete contracts is too large to be summarized in this short article. 
The interested reader may refer to Tirole (1999) for an overview or elsewhere in this 
dictionary or to the entry for this term in this Dictionary.  
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David Martimort 
 
See also adverse selection; agency problems; incentive contracts; incomplete 
contracts; mechanism design; mechanism design (recent developments); moral 
hazard.  
 
I thank D. Gromb and J. Pouyet for helpful comments on an earlier version. 
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